This paper presents a theory of social policy preferences that emphasizes the role of skills. The key to our argument is that individuals who have made risky investments in skills will demand insurance against the possible future loss of income from those investments. Most income is derived from past investments in skills, and because the transferability of skills is inversely related to their specificity, workers with specific skills faces a potentially long spell of unemployment, or a significant decline in income, in the event of job loss. Workers deriving most of their income from specific skills therefore have strong incentives to support social policies that protect them against this uncertainty. This is not the case for general skills workers who will be more concerned about the costs of social protection. We test the theory on public opinion data for 12 advanced democracies, and suggest that differences in educational systems explain a substantial portion of cross-national variance in the level of social protection.
Introduction
It is a well known fact that human capital rivals physical capital as a source of personal and national wealth. Indeed, it is the singular most important determinant of personal income in advanced industrialized countries. Yet, whereas physical assets --buildings, machinery, goods, and money --have long been recognized as essential for understanding the political interests of their owners, surprisingly little is known about the role of human capital in explaining public policy preferences. With the exception of trade policy, 1 it is only the cognitive aspects of education that have received systematic attention in explaining political preferences (Klingemann 1979; Kitschelt 1994; Duch and Taylor 1993) .
Following Becker (1964) , we conceptualize human skills as an investment, and asks how the character of this investment affects workers' preferences for social protection. We approach this question in a fashion that is similar to the way transaction cost economics explains the use of nonmarket institutions to overcome market failures (Williamson 1985) . In a political version of this logic, endogenous trade theory hypothesizes that investments in physical assets that are specific to a particular location or economic transaction lead firms to lobby the state for protection against uninsurable risks (see Alt et al. 1999) . Since pulling out assets in response to adverse conditions is difficult, firms will want protection against the effects of such conditions. We start from the similar idea that investment in skills that are specific to a particular firm or industry exposes their owners to risks for which they will seek non-market protection. Skills that are portable, by contrast, do not command extensive non-market protection, just as the exchange of homogeneous goods do not require elaborate non-market governance structures.
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Our theory does not necessarily contradict a long tradition in the study of the welfare state that emphasizes redistibution as a key political motive behind the welfare state (e.g., Korpi 1989 , Esping-Andersen 1990 . Indeed, Meltzer and Richard's (1981) influential median voter model of government spending, which focuses on the redistributive aspect of social protection, emerges as a special case in our model. Given a particular composition of skills, workers with higher income are likely to demand less social protection than workers with low income. Our argument parts ways with the Meltzer-Richard model, however, because we explicitly recognize that social protection also has an insurance aspect (Sinn 1995, Moene and Wallerstein 1999) , and that demand for insurance varies between workers according to their degree of exposure to risks (Baldwin 1992) . Critically, in our model the demand for social insurance is inversely related to the generality of workers' skills.
We test our model on public opinion data for 12 OECD countries and show that differences in individual support for social protection are indeed critically dependent on whether workers derive their income primarily from general as opposed to specific skills. We also show that countries where the educational system favors investments in specific skills tend to have significantly higher levels of social protection than countries where the educational system advantages general skills.
Because the composition of skills in the labor force affects the competitive advantages of firms, the system of social protection reinforces the international division of labor and thereby indirectly cross-national differences in the support for the welfare state.
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. In the first we present the model and its main empirical implications. In the second section we test these implications on public opinion data from. The third section discusses the broader implications of the model for explaining differences in social protection across countries, while the concluding section pinpoints some topics for future research. 3 Evidence also shows this to be a realistic assumption. For example, based on OECD data on unemployment replacement rates, the average replacement rate for a worker with an income at the mean is 36 percent while for a worker with 2/3 of the mean income it is 43 percent. Since low-income workers are also over-represented among the unemployed, the redistributive effect is greater than these numbers suggest. Similarly, there is ample empirical evidence that after-tax income is more equally distributed than pre-tax income (Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000) .
The Model

Assumptions
Workers derive their income from skills that can be either general or specific. Specific skills are skills that are valuable only to a single firm or to a group of firms (whether an industry or a sector), whereas general skills are portable across all firms. We then distinguish three different employment situations, or states of the world, each associated with distinct levels of income. In State I a worker is employed in a firm that utilizes both his specific and general skills; in State II the worker is employed in a firm that only utilizes his general skills; and in State III the worker is unemployed (i.e., none of his skills are being utilized).
In State I the worker is paid the combined value of his specific and general skills, or sg, and in State II the worker is paid for his general skills, g, only. If a worker has no specific skills, then s=1 and she is always employed at the market value of her general skills. The key assumption is that general skills are marketable in all sectors of the economy, whereas specific skills are only marketable in one sector (the size of which is defined by the specificity of skills).
In addition to market income, workers receive transfer income from the government. In the neocorporatist literature such income is sometimes referred to as a "social wage" (Cameron 1984) , and it includes unemployment benefits, health benefits, pensions, and other forms of non-wage compensation. We assume that transfers come in the form of a flat-rate payment, R, which captures the idea in the Meltzer-Richard model that there is a redistributive aspect to social protection.
3 Following the terminology in Estevez et al. (1999) , one can distinguish between 4 4 As we discuss below, wage protection does not have to come through the state but may be build into the wage setting system. For now we can ignore this complication, which does not alter the basic results.
5 A third type of protection identified by Estevez et al. (1999) is called employment protection and refers to legal and other barriers to layoffs. In the present model this type of protection could be modeled as a probability of keeping a job where a worker's skills were fully utilized. To keep things simple we, however, we treat social policy as a single instrument, R.
transfers that go to support the income of employed workers, wage protection 4 , and transfers that go to the unemployed, unemployment protection. 5 In the development of the model we will discuss what happens if R only goes to unemployment protection. But for the most part we will assume that all workers receive the same flat-rate subsidy, which may simply be referred to as income protection.
Transfers are paid out of a flat-rate tax (t) on all wages. Total per capita receipts are T, and all receipts are spend on transfers (i.e., we assume balanced budgets). As in the Meltzer-Richard model, taxation is assumed to create work disincentives, captured here by the following simple labor supply function:
where l(t) is the amount of hours worked or intensity of effort (the particular form of this function is chosen for mathematical convenience). This implies that total tax income is where w/(1+t) is average taxable income. Figure 1 illustrates the three states of labor market, and shows the disposable (after tax) income associated with each state: sg R and g , , .
5 α = r e = r q (p + q ⋅ ⋅ ).
(3) For a given period of time, there is a probability, p, of losing one's job, and another probability, q, of re-employment. In equilibrium p·e=q·ã, where e is the share of employed workers and ã is the share of the workforce that is unemployed (e=1-ã). This implies that in equilibrium e=q/(p+q).
Furthermore, if r is the probability that an employed worker is in State I (i.e., is in a job where both general and specific skills are utilized), then the share of the labor force employed in State I is Likewise, the share of the labor force employed in State II is while the share of the labor force in State III (unemployment) is For any individual worker with both specific and general skills, the proportions á, â, and ã can be interpreted as probabilities in a lottery with three possible outcomes. An employed sg-worker will therefore seek to maximize the expected utility of income across all three states. Ignoring the discounting of future income (which makes no substantive difference to our results), this is captured by the following utility function: 
and (7) where u(.) is the worker's utility from income. Using standard assumptions, we impose the following constraints on u:
A number of the results below hold for this general form of utility function (notably the MeltzerRichard results). However, since the insurance function of the social wage will play an important role and since we then need specific conditions on risk aversion, we follow the standard procedure of using a constant Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion (RRA) utility function. Specifically, With these assumptions in mind, we can now find workers' utility-maximizing preferences for social protection.
Optimizing social preferences
The logic of the presentation in this section is as follows. We first consider a simple base-line model with no insurance effects, no tax disincentives, only general skills, and no unemployment (section i). We then introduce tax disincentives to get the Meltzer-Richard result (section ii), and subsequently add insurance effects (and unemployment) 
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1 2 0 (10) (e=1). The simplest case is where there are no tax disincentive effects on the amount of hours supplied (so l(t)=1 rather than as we shall subsequently assume l(t)=1/(1+t)).
When s=1, e=1, and l(t)=1 equation (6) reduces to:
Choosing R to maximize V implies This produces the standard result that in the absence of insurance functions and tax disincentives, voters will want the maximum R (i.e., t=1) if g<w and a zero R (t=0) if g>w. Thus, if the median voter, M, has an income less than the average income of w, the median voter will always vote for a maximum tax rate. The result is illustrated in Figure 2 , panel a.
[ Figure 2 about This implies so that in the Meltzer-Richard model, only voters with a g-level below that of half the average wage (g=w/2) will vote for a maximum tax rate. Assuming the median voter has a g-level above 8 6 Meltzer-Richard have a more general tax disincentive function than that used here. In consequence the tax rate which maximizes tax revenue can be less than one.
w/2, he will therefore not vote for the maximum tax rate. Because of the simplicity of our tax disincentive function, voters with g levels below w/2 will vote for t=1 and voters with g levels above w/2 will vote for t=0. 6 As in the Meltzer-Richard model, workers with income in the range ]w/2, w[ will prefer taxation up to the point where the benefits to them from redistibution are exactly outweighted by the costs of tax disincentives. If the median voter is in this range, as the Meltzer-Richard model assumes, then she or he may vote for a positive tax rate less than 1. The logic is illustrated in Figure 2 , panel b.
One of the implications of the Meltzer-Richard model is that voter turnout will be related to spending because non-voting tends to be concentrated among low-income people (Lijphart 1997) .
There is some cross-national evidence for this proposition (see Franzese 1998) . On the other hand, there is little empirical support for another implication of the model, developed by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , namely that relatively inegalitarian societies will exhibit greater pressures for redistributive spending than relatively egalitarian ones (see Perotti 1996) . Among advanced countries the relationship is actually the opposite (Bénabou 1996 (Moene and Wallerstein 1999) , it is assumed that workers can either be employed at a gross wage equal to their "tax-incentivised" skill level g/(1+t) or be unemployed. There are no specific skills (s=1), so equation (6) becomes:
Moene-Wallerstein show that if relative risk aversion is greater than unity, then workers will choose a higher tax rate as they become wealthier: in other words, their aversion to risk outweighs the increased cost to them of insurance as their income increases. Put differently, when risk-aversion is high (RRA>1), and if all transfers go to the unemployed, the relationship between income (g) and the preferred level of social protection is positive (see Figure   2 , panel c). A key implication of this result is that, contrary to the implication of the MeltzerRichard model, a means-preserving increase in inequality will reduce the median voter's preferred level of social protection (provided that the income distribution is skewed to the right). The reason is that such a rise in inequality lowers the income of the median voter, and since the insurance motive dominates the redistribution motive (RRA>1), demand for social protection will decline. In the Meltzer-Richard model there is no insurance motive, so a fall in the income of the median voter always leads to a rise in the demand for social protection.
(iv) Disincentive effects, insurance effects, specific and general skills: the asset model. This is the most general model and requires us to consider all three states in Figure 1 . We therefore return to the present value of utility given by equation (6):
We will proceed to ask, first, up to what income levels corresponding to s and g is the optimal R at a maximum; second, under what RRA conditions does R fall or rise as s and g increase; and third what happens to the choice of R as the balance of general and specific skills changes.
In the first result we show that it is unlikely that the sg worker with average income level w will choose the maximum tax rate (in this model of unity). This will only be the case if the weight attached to unemployment is very high and g is sufficiently below w/2; the precise conditions are given by Result I (b).
Result I: Given the assumptions of Model (iv) we can first establish that (a) the set of maximum combinations of sg and g at which t=1 are given by
In order for this equality to hold when sg<w the following condition must be satisfied (see proof in Appendix):
Assuming that the proportion of workers who are in jobs where their skills are utilized is greater than the proportion of working in unemployment (á>ã), which is likely to hold, the first term is positive. General skills income, g, would therefore have to be very small for the inequality not to hold. Hence, a sg worker with average skill level w will likely prefer t<1.
We now consider what happens when sg increases, holding g constant, or vice versa. As we show in the Appendix, the following result holds:
What this equality means is that the direction of the relationship between R and income (the sign on the equality) depends on the level of risk-aversion, just as in the simple Moene-Wallerstein. However, for income to be positively related to support for spending the RRA requirement is more stringent ( ) than before (RRA>1). The reason is that R now goes to the
employed as well as to the unemployed, and since employed workers in the Moene-Wallerstein model only have an insurance incentive in relationship to unemployment, RRA must be higher for the insurance motive to dominate the redistribution motive. This result is also demonstrated by
Moene and Wallerstein.
Now we come to the critical result which differentiates our approach from the previous ones.
Central to the argument of the paper is the proposition that an increase in general skills relative to specific skills, holding constant the level of expected income, implies a reduction in preferred R:
put broadly, workers with general skills will prefer lower taxes and social protection than workers with specific skills.
The natural way to model a constant level of expected income is to assume a constant expected present value of utility -or in terms of equation (6) As g rises, the preferred level of R goes down. The intuition behind this key result is that workers with specific skills have more to fear if they lose their job than workers with general skills. This is because specific skill workers who are laid off face the risk of being re-employed in a sector where their skills are not needed. If this happens they will lose some of their previous income.
General skill workers do not face this problem because they are always paid the value of their general skills. Hence, the more income is derived from general as opposed to specific skills -that is, the higher the ratio g/s -the greater the demand for income protection (R). The logic is illustrated in Figure 2 , panel d, and implies that the median voter support for social protection 12 depends on his or her labor market skills.
A corollary of the model (proved in the in Appendix) is that as specific skills decline relative to general skills (and assuming present value of income is held constant) dR/dg goes to zero:
In other words, the more in come is derived from general skills, the smaller the effect of g on support for social protection. Hence, we should observe a smaller effect of g in educational systems that emphasize the creation of general skills compared to systems emphasizing specific skills.
Summarizing the results in this section: with the simplest set of assumptions -only one state of the world (employment), only general skills, and no tax disincentives -the politics of social spending is all about redistribution (class politics if you will): those with a wage below the mean will want a maximum rate of taxation (t=1) whereas those above the mean will want zero taxation. If we add tax disincentives, however, the cost of redistribution may deter those lowincome workers closest to the mean from demanding confiscatory taxation, and the median voter is likely to be among these workers. This is the Meltzer-Richard model.
When an unemployment state is added to the model, an entirely new motive enters into workers calculation of their interests: insurance against loss of income. If workers are sufficiently riskaverse, and if all transfers go to the unemployed, rising income may in fact be associated with higher demand for protection since high-income workers have more to lose than low-income workers. This is the Moene-Wallerstein model. If some transfers go to the employed, however, the threshold of risk-aversion for which this relationship holds goes up since transfers to the employed only serves redistributive purposes.
Finally, when differences in the specificity of skills are introduced, which require at least two 13 7 The reason is missing variables in the 1996 data. In the case of Australia there was no variable for region, which in many cases is important in accounting for variance in personal income. The 1996 German data are missing a variable for weekly hours of work (which is related to both income and education). In the case of Italy the personal income variable was not used in the 1996 survey. 8 The program is called AMELIA and described in King et al. (1999) . We wish to thank one of the authors of the program, Kenneth Scheve, for patiently answering all our questions about how to use it. employment states (Sector I and II in our model), the insurance motive plays a crucial role even when workers are only moderately risk-averse (0<RRA<1) and even when transfers are distributed to both employed and unemployed workers. The reason is that employed workers risk losing the income from their specific skills, regardless of their exposure to unemployment. This coupling between skills and demand for insurance transforms the relationship between income and social policy preferences. The next section explores whether this is supposed by empirical evidence using public opinion data from 12 OECD countries.
Testing the model
The only cross-national public opinion survey that allows us to put the core hypotheses of the model to a rigorous test is the International Social Survey Program's data on the role of government in selected OECD countries (ISSP 1999) . Unlike other surveys, this one has extensive questions about peoples' support for social protection as well as information that enables us to measure (albeit imperfectly) individual income from skills.
We use data for 12 advanced OECD countries: Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and United States. In most cases the data are from 1996. The exceptions are Australia, Germany, and Italy where the data are from 1991. 7 Because the data set contains a fairly large number of missing values, we employed a multiple imputation procedure to estimate these values. The procedure, developed by Honaker et al. (1999) 8 , overcomes potential problems of inefficient and biased results when missing data are
non-random. We note, however, that the results reported below are very similar to those based on non-imputed data (using so-called "listwise deletion").
Statistical Model
It follows directly from the model that the change in R is a weighted sum of the change in V (the present value of expected income) and g (the income from general skills):
where Result II says that a<0 if 0<RRA<
(and a $0 otherwise), Result III says that b sg sg w − / 2 is negative if RRA>0, and Result IV says a goes to zero as s goes to 1. Hence, b<0 tests our main hypothesis that the composition of skills matters for social preferences, whereas a<0 tests whether 0<RRA<
.
Since V R = 0 is a necessary condition for maximization, the change in the value of expected income is:
And since we have that the relative weights on dsg and dg are approximately á and â so long as RRA is close to zero.
Hence, if we integrate the linear approximation of (14), using (15) and (16), we get which is the equation to be estimated.
Unfortunately we cannot measure expected income, á·sg + â·g, directly since we do not know
whether any particular worker is employed in a sector that fully utilizes her specific skills.
However, if there exists a continuum of sectors, with different degrees of utilization of a worker's specific skills, then actual income, W, will be an unbiased proxy for expected income. Hence, the model we actually estimate is Before proceeding, we need to point out one complication using W. Since actual income is determined in part by factors, such as sex and union membership, that are unrelated to skills, when g rises, s does not necessarily decline (as in the theoretical model). Consequently, whether g is a good proxy for skill composition, g/s, depends on the empirical relationship between g and s as illustrated in Figure 3 . The figure relates g/s (on the y-axis) to g (on the x-axis), and shows how the relationship changes depending on the correlation between s and g. If r s,g =-1, g would be a perfect proxy for g/s since any rise in g would be accompanied by a decline in s. If r s,g =1, on the other hand, g would be unrelated to g/s since higher values on g would always be coupled with higher values on s. In other words, as r s,g goes to1, g tells us less and less about the actual composition of skills. However, r s,g =1 is an extreme and improbable case, and it is important to note that if there is a bias it is always in the direction of not finding support for the hypothesized effects of g. In other words, the model in equation (18) provides a conservative test of the effect of skills.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Empirically, there is some reason to expect that the underlying correlation varies across countries.
Consequently, the strength of the results for particular countries may also vary even if the strength of the true relationship does not. The issue arises because some countries have educational systems with distinct tracks that lead either to vocational certification or to an academic degree, whereas other countries have a more fluid division between vocational and general education. We would expect that educational choices lead to more distinct career patterns in two-track systems than in less institutionalized systems. If so, r s,g would be smaller (possibly negative) in the former 16 9 We experimented some with the functional form and found that using the square-root of W gave the best fit. To keep the presentation simple we do not indicate this transformation. 10 In some countries a distinction is made between incomplete and complete primary education, but very few have failed to complete primary school in our set of countries, and the distinction makes no notable difference to the results.
countries than in the latter (where r s,g may be positive). One needs to be attentive to these issues when interpreting the results.
Measurement
Independent variables. The measure of g is constructed in a two-step procedure. We first estimate the following wage equation:
9 where E i are the i education variables and O j are j non-skill related determinants of income. We then construct a variable for g, using the estimated â i coefficients:
where c s is a constant that can be ignored for our purposes.
The general skills indicators (E i ) are derived from two survey questions: one asking respondents to state the number of years in formal education (0 and up), the other recording the respondent's highest academic degree. Since academic degree is at best an ordinal-scale variable, we split it into five dummy variables: 1) completed primary degree or lower 10 ; 2) incomplete secondary; 3) complete secondary; 4) incomplete and completed semi-higher degree, or incomplete university degree; and 5) completed university degree. This way we do not impose any artificial constraints on the functional relationship between academic degree and income.
11 For each question, the respondent could indicate five levels of support or opposition to additional spending. In the first three questions, the respondent could answer "[spend] much less," "less," "the same as now", "more" and "much more." In the last question the respondent could answer "strongly in favor of," "in favor of," "neither in favor of, nor against," "against," and "strongly against." 12 One can debate whether subsidies to protect jobs belong in the measure. In practice it makes little difference for the results.
For the other determinants of income (O j ), we used the following set of variables: 1) weekly hours of work; 2) part-time work; 3) age; 4) gender; 5) union membership; 6) supervisory position; 7) public sector employment; and 8) region (the latter is a set of country-specific dummies). In the case of United States a dummy variable for race was also included. Several of these variables were also used in the analysis of policy preferences as discussed below. Other questions about government spending, such as spending on the environment and the arts, are unrelated to our theoretical argument, and therefore excluded from the index. Indeed, these forms of spending have often been argued to belong to a separate, "post-materialist" or "libertarian", dimension, which has been hypothesized to be positively associated with general education (see Kitschelt 1994; and Duch and Taylor 1993) . We will later examine this possibility as a check on the validity of the results for social spending.
Dependent variables
To ensure that the findings are not sensitive to the particular construction of the spending index, 18 13 The respondent could answer "definitely should be," "probably should be," "probably should not be," and "definitely should not be." 14 We also tried using a much more narrow question about whether the government should protect jobs in declining industries. The results are similar to those reported for the broader question.
and to capture other aspects of social protection, we included two additional indicators in the analysis. One is a measure of employment protection since job guarantees may be used by governments as a substitute for income protection. Workers with specific skills should be particularly keen to support such policies if these improve the prospects of staying in a firm or industry where the workers have made asset-specific investments. It is captured here by a question asking people whether they believe it "should be or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants it."
13 This question is clearly more encompassing than what we are interested in, job security, but it is reasonable to expect that people who support high levels of employment protection, in the narrow sense, will also support an expansive role for the state in guaranteeing employment opportunities.
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The second variable is an alternative wage protection index, which attempts to capture the fact that incomes are often regulated at the level of wages and prices, rather than through transfers.
The index is partly based on questions that ask people to indicate their support for government controls on wages and prices. While such policies are partly designed hold down the level of wages and prices, they also reduce the scope for changes in relative wages. For this reason we expect workers with specific skills to be more favorably disposed to them. Furthermore, since unions are in many countries the most important guarantors of wages for workers with specific skills (because specific skills workers have poor outside options), we also used a question that asks people whether they think unions have too little or too much power. All three variables were combined into a simple additive wage protection index that varies between 1 and 5.
To summarize, the measure that most directly relates to our theoretical argument is the social spending index. However, the measures of wage and employment protection provide useful 19 checks on the reliability of the spending results, and the variables are interesting in their own right.
Findings
For each of the 12 countries, and for each of the three dependent variables, we estimated the regression model in equation (18), including a set of relevant control variables. We start by examining the results for one country --we have arbitrarily picked Sweden -in some detail and then discuss the results for the other 11 countries in a more summary fashion. When assessing the effects of various control variables in the Swedish case we will make some passing comparisons to the results for other countries, although the latter are not shown for reasons of space.
Columns (1)- (3) in Table 1 show the Swedish results for our three dependent variables. First note that the parameters for income and general skill income -W and g -are always negative and statistically significant at a .01 level or better. The negative effect of income suggests that the redistributive motive outweighs the insurance motive in peoples' support for social protection.
Workers are simply not sufficiently risk-averse for the Moene-Wallerstein argument to apply to the types of social protection we consider here.
[ Table 1 about here]
Concerning g, the results are clearly supportive of our argument that skill composition matters for social policy preferences. To get a sense of substantive impact, Figure 4 shows the relationship between income and support for spending in the case where g is one standard deviation above, and one standard deviation below, its mean. Assuming that the underlying correlation between g and the unknown s is 0, the difference of 0.35 points between the two lines corresponds to one standard deviation on the theoretically relevant g/s variable. This difference is equivalent to .54 standard deviations on the dependent spending variable.
Another way to convey the magnitude of the effect is to compare it to the difference in support for spending between the mean supporter of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) and 20 15 The magnitudes of the effects for other dependent variables are similar. 16 The analysis only included individuals who expressed a party preference. 17 Assuming that all other variables are held constant.
18 Union membership raises the probability of SAP support by approximately 20 percent. All other variables, taken individually, have less impact. mean supporter of the Conservative Party (Moderatene) -two parties that were at opposite extremes in terms of spending preferences. It turns out that the gap between low-g workers and high-g workers is equivalent to 60 percent of this difference.
Adding income to the analysis, if the comparison was between a general and specific skill worker who were one standard deviation apart in terms of income -illustrated by the dashed line in Figure 4 --the difference in support for spending would be .64, which is the same as one standard deviation on the dependent variable, and greater than the difference of .59 between mean social democratic and conservative party supporters. By these standards, our results are clearly politically meaningful.
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[ Figure 4 about here]
A more direct way to gauge the political significance of skills is to put political party support on the left-hand-side of the equation, and then use logistic regression to evaluate the effects of the independent variables. Column (4) of Table 1 show the results of such an analysis using support for social democrats (SAP) as the dependent variable.
16 By this method, a specific skill worker is more than 30 percent more likely to vote for SAP than a general skills worker (using the same definitions as before). 17 As in the case of social policy preferences, the skill variable is statistically highly significant (p<.001) and exerts a greater impact on party choice than any other variable, including union membership. 18 Much of this effect, it should be noted, goes through social policy preferences. This is evident if any of the protection variables are included in the regression, since much of the effect of skills then disappears.
Turning to the results for the control variables in Table 1 , it is not surprising to find that union membership is associated with significantly higher support for social protection, whereas the opposite is true for self-employed and part-time workers. The strong effect of union membership is universal across countries, and the results for self-employed and part-time workers hold in the majority of the 12 national cases. The effect of part-time work applies primarily to employment and wage protection, possibly reflecting that high levels of protection on this dimension reduce employment opportunities in private services where part-time employment is widespread (Iversen and Wren 1998) .
Overall, women are more prone than men to support social protection. This is a universal finding across all 12 countries, and presumably reflects a tendency for women to be in more vulnerable labor market positions than men. As argued by Estevez (1999), women require more protection than men in comparable jobs because they need to be able to leave, and return, to the labor market for the purpose of child rearing. Some of this gender effect disappears, however, if the skill variable is removed from the equation. The likely reason is that women, all else being equal, tend to have better general education than men, and general education is negatively related to support for protection. This finding makes sense in rational choice terms since women will be dissuaded from investing in highly specific skills . Or, to put it differently, when women have invested in specific skills they are more prone to support high levels of social protection, but they are somewhat less prone to invest in these skills in the first place.
Concerning public employment it is often argued that public employees have a "producer interest" in a generous welfare state. But the effects of public sector employment in Sweden are perhaps not as strong as one might have suspected, and in countries where the public sector is smaller and has a larger proportion of civil servants, such as Germany, the relationship is absent or reversed.
In fact, support for social protection, other than wage protection, is higher in Sweden among those employed in manufacturing, a pattern that is repeated in several other countries. A possible reason is that manufacturing workers feel particularly exposed to labor market risks as a result of many years of deindustrialization (Iversen and Cusack 2000) .
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19 The reason for the particular ordering of countries will become apparent in a moment.
While the results for Sweden are clearly consistent with our argument about skills, it may be objected that we have tapped into a general anti-statist or anti-regulatory sentiment among those with long formal educations. Following the rise of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, it is conceivable that these workers have been schooled into believing that all government spending is undesirable.
To test this possibility we regressed support for government spending on culture and the arts against our independent variables (see column 5 of Table 1 ). If those with general education are opposed government spending as a matter of principle, they should also oppose this type of spending. Indeed they should be particularly opposed to such spending since it has no economic justification. But they are not. To the contrary, those who derive their income primarily from general skills are much more likely to support government spending on culture and the arts than others.
The finding probably reflects cognitive predispositions, or "tastes," acquired through years of immersion into the symbol-intensive environment of higher education. But whatever the reason, the simple lesson of these results seems to be that people support government spending whenever it improves their own personal welfare. There is no blanket support for, or opposition to, government spending among any particular group of workers. Low wage workers and specific skill workers are concerned with social protection, but they look upon state subsidies for culture and art as a waste of tax-payers' money. By contrast, high-paid general skills workers demand little social protection, but the are large consumers of state-subsidized culture and arts.
Turning to the evidence from the remaining 11 countries, Table 2 shows that the core findings for Sweden are not exceptional. 19 The table lists the estimated parameters for the theoretical variables, while omitting the controls to save space. The regressions were specified exactly the same way as in the Swedish case and, as already noted, yield broadly similar results. First note that 33 out of 36 parameters for income are negative and statistically significant. The only exceptions are Japan in the cases of spending (no effect) and wage protection (negative but 23 insignificant), and Italy in the case of spending (negative but insignificant). The estimated parameters for the relationship between income and support for social protection thus provide overwhelming support for the Meltzer-Richard results that high income workers want less social protection than low income workers. This does not preclude that the Moene-Wallerstein argument holds for other types of social protection, especially targeted spending on the nonemployed, but in most areas of social policy it appears to be the case that a rise in inequality will be associated with increased demand for redistribution.
[ Table 2 about here]
The results for the general skill variable are also clear. In every single case but one (wage protection in Canada), the relationship between general skills and support for social protection is negative, and in most cases the effect is significant at a .01 level or better. As expected, the results are particularly strong for countries with highly developed two-track vocational training systems:
France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden. They tend to be weaker in countries like Italy and Japan where most training occurs at in the firm after a completed general education, and where it is not unusual for engineers and other well-educated workers to spend most of their careers in a single firm acquiring a range of specific skills. The results are also relatively weak in three countriesBritain, Canada and United States --where the educational systems are primarily oriented toward general skills. This is consistent with Result IV (the effect of a change in g declines when s gets smaller) in the theoretical section.
Overall, the results are weakest in Japan, Canada, and Britain. In the cases of Britain and Canada income is by far the most important explanatory variable, possibly reflecting more redistributive social systems. In the case of Japan the fit of the model is very poor, with none of the explanatory variables exerting much of an impact. A likely reason is that protection at the enterprise level in Japan is much more important than in other countries, which is not captured by any of the survey questions. The life time employment system is precisely build to protect employees with skill assets that are highly valuable to the company (Aoki 1988) . Hence, it is at least plausible that if we had questions about social protection at the enterprise level, the predicted results would emerge more clearly.
Implications for explaining cross-national differences in social protection
The model and evidence we have presented show that skills shape peoples' preferences for social protection. Specific skills represent more risky investments than general skills, and workers with specific skills consequently demand more insurance against the possible future loss of job and income. This search for protection is likely to reach beyond traditional state-sponsored social policies. As the Japanese case suggests, even more important than interventionist state policies may be "private" non-market institutions such as labor unions, collective wage bargaining institutions, and employee representation at the enterprise level. These non-governmental institutions are particularly important in relation to what we have called wage and employment protection (see Castles 1985 Castles , 1994 . In fact, the most important source of wage protection is probably not government transfers, but industry-coordinated wage-setting systems. Such systems ensure that wages for particular skill categories are synchronized across firms in an industry, thereby guaranteeing that unemployed skilled workers will be re-employed at a wage that is similar to previous earnings (Soskice 1990; Wallerstein 1999; Reuda and Pontusson 2000) .
Likewise, while employment protection may come through legal restrictions on firms ability to hire and fire, such protection can also be accomplished through consultative bodies at the firm level, giving employees influence over management and manpower decisions. The German works council system is an often cited example, but many firms in northern Europe and japan have similar arrangements for employee representation.
The point of this discussion is to underscore that our model is not exclusively applicable to social policy, narrowly defined, but also to industrial policy, labor market policy, and a range of "private" policies complementing the welfare state. In this broader conception, our model ties in with the "varieties of capitalism" approach (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Hall and Soskice forthcoming, Iversen et al. 2000) . This approach emphasizes that economic institutions and policies are often complementary to one another, with one of these institutional complementarities running from the system of social protection to the system of training ). This paper emphasizes a different complementarity, namely the linkage between the skill system and political support for social protection. In particular, if skill profiles vary systematically across countries, our theory implies that political demand for social protection will also vary systematically.
Unfortunately we cannot test this hypothesis directly using public opinion data because people are only asked whether they prefer more or less social protection, not what level of protection they would like to have. 20 Since the level of protection varies across countries --presumably more or less in accordance with popular demand --there is no reason to expect systematic cross-national differences in the support for change. We can, however, examine the relationship between skill system and actual levels of protection, assuming that differences in outcomes reflect the prevalent social preferences in the electorate.
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In terms of training systems, our 12 countries divide rather neatly into one half with highly developed vocational systems, and one half with poorly developed vocational systems (but good general educational systems). In the first category of countries --France, Italy, Japan, Germany, Norway, and Sweden --a large percentage of a age cohort go through a longer period of vocational training (typically 3-5 years), and such training is geared towards developing specific skills; either for a particular firm, a particular industry, or some combination of the two. The share 26 22 Based on UNESCO (199?) figures for the number of students in secondary vocational training or in short-term tertiary programs leading to vocationally oriented degrees (ISCED5).
of an age cohort that goes through a vocational training varies between 15 and 37 percent in this group of countries. 22 In a country like Japan, and to a lesser extent Italy, most training takes place inside large companies, whereas in a country like Sweden most of the training takes place through vocational schools. Germany has a hybrid system with equal emphasis on-the-job training and school-based training. France, and to some extent also Italy, combines some aspects of all these types.
Among the general skill countries --Australia, Britain, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the US --only Britain and Ireland have anything that approximates an institutionalized vocational training system. In both cases about 9 percent of an age cohort goes through a vocational training.
However it is widely recognized that genuine vocational training in Britain has been on the decline since the early 1970s (Wood 1997) , and the so-called General National Vocational Qualifications system, introduced with the intention of providing higher-level vocational qualifications, is now seen as more akin to an intermediate general education degree than to a vocational qualification (Woolf ???). For the other general skills countries, initial vocational training tends to be weak and relatively short (2 years and less), and for all these countries there is little involvement of companies in the training system. Even counting short-term post-secondary degrees, such as the American junior college system, only between three and four percent of an age cohort receive a vocational degree. On the other hand, the post-compulsory general education system tends to be strong with a large proportion of an age cohort getting an advanced degree.
In order to examine whether these differences in skills systems are linked to differences in social protection, Figure 5 compares the two groups of countries on four indicators of social protection.
The first is a composite measure of unemployment protection, the second is OECD's measure of employment protection, the third is a measure of the degree of coordination in wage-setting (a key component of the wage protection system), while the fourth measures government transfers as a proportion of GDP (as a measure of the size of the "social wage"). All indicators have been 27 standardized to vary between 0 and 1 to facilitate comparison. The numbers next to the country labels are the percentages of an age cohort receiving some kind of secondary or post-secondary vocational training.
What stands out is that all the specific skills countries have notable higher levels of protection than any of the general skills countries. Using the mean of the four indicators as a proxy for the overall level of protection, a simple dummy variable for skill system explains 83 percent of the variance in protection. If we use the shares of an age cohort in some kind of vocational training as the independent variable, the explained variance is 79 percent. Although we cannot directly establish the mechanism that links the training system to the social protection system, we do know from the analysis in the previous section that specific skill workers demand more social protection than general skills workers. Assuming that such demands find expression in the political system, either through voting or through organized channels like unions, the macro data is therefore entirely consistent with the micro data.
[ Figure 5 about here] This is confirmed if we instead of focusing on the institutional features of the training system look at a behavioral indicator: mean company tenure rates. The idea is that workers who have made investments in industry-and (especially) firm-specific skills will be less likely to leave a company since the outside market for those skills is small or non-existent. Firms will also be less inclined to lay off skilled workers in so far as their skills represent specific assets to the firm. Countries with a skill profile that is biased towards the specific end will therefore tend to feature longer average firm tenure rates (OECD 1997).
Used as an indicator of skill-specificity, tenure rates are in fact closely linked to the level of social protection in our 12 countries as illustrated in Figure 6 . Countries with short tenure rates have low protection, while those with long tenure rates have high protection. Indeed, the correlation between tenure rates and social protection is almost perfect (r =.84). As we would expect, the 28 23 Comparative data on occupational tenure rates are not available. correlation between tenure rates and the share of an age cohort in vocational training is also high:
.79. The one country that falls slightly out of the pattern, Norway, has a decidedly small-firm structure compared to the other countries in the sample. This matters because small firms depend less on their own proprietary technologies, and hence have less firm-specific knowledge to pass on to their employees. Even if skills are equally specific to an occupation, there will tend to be more labor mobility across small firms than across large firms.
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[ Figure 6 about here]
It is also noteworthy that countries in the general skills cluster tend to have significantly higher wage dispersion than countries in the specific skills cluster. From a pure Meltzer-Richard model we should have expected the opposite to be the case since the pressure for redistribution is greatest in the most inegalitarian societies. In our model, however, this empirical pattern is possible because the difference in support between workers with specific and general skills may trump any difference across countries in the relative income of the median voter. Indeed, we can go one step further since wage dispersion is itself at least partly a function of social protection.
Wage protection through the collective wage bargaining system, in particular, has strong equalizing effects on the wage structure (Wallerstein 1999; Reuda and Pontusson 2000) . If wage compression is a function of social protection, then it is always the case in our model that specific skills countries simultaneously feature social protection and higher equality than general skills countries.
Conclusion
It is a well-known fact that a substantial portion of both national and personal income can be attributed to human capital, broadly conceived. It is therefore not surprising that the asset-29 specificity of this capital matters a great deal for the amount of social insurance demanded by workers. Like physical capital, human capital can be more or less mobile, and workers who have made heavy investments in asset-specific skills stand a greater risk of losing a substantial portion of their income than workers who have invested in portable skills. For this reason, specific skill workers have a greater incentive to support policies and institutions that protect their jobs and income.
Because social protection tends to benefit low-income people more than high-income people, position in the income distribution also divides public opinion. However, at any given level of income, workers with specific skills are more inclined to support high levels of protection than those with general skills. This helps us understand why countries with a highly developed vocational training systems, with a focus on cultivating specific skills, have higher support for social protection as well as more egalitarian income distributions. Because developed vocational systems have a dampening effect on income inequality, while simultaneously creating high demand for social protection, equality and redistribution tend to go hand in hand. In Meltzer-Richard model this is not possible because the pressure for redistribution is always greatest in countries with the most skewed income distribution.
If our argument is correct, there is no necessary tension between redistributive social protection and competitiveness as argued by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) . Because social protection serves as an insurance against loss of specific skill investments, social protection may well be a requite for such investments in the first place. Firms that depend on a workforce with extensive specific skills to compete effectively in their chosen product markets can therefore benefit from high levels of social protection. Conversely, firms that depend primarily on workers with general skills would be harmed by the costs of social protection without benefitting from the supply-side effects of higher protection. Whether social protection undermines competitiveness therefore depends entirely on the position of countries in the international division of labor.
Finally our model points to an important source of cross-time variance in support for social 1) The share of an age cohort in either secondary or post-secondary (ISCED5) training. Source: UNESCO (1999).
2) OECD's index of employment protection based on the "restrictiveness" of individual hiring and firing rules, as well as collective dismissal rules. Source: OECD Employment Outlook (1999) . 2) Average of the four indicators in Figure 5 .
